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RULE 10b-5: THE SEARCH FOR A LIMITING DOCTRINE
HILARY P. BRADFORD*
I.

INTRODUCTION

HE writer of an article on Rule 10b-51 is likely to disclose (in addition to
a possible ignorance of the subject) something of himself. He may be one
of those buoyant individuals who go happily about, scouting the frontiers of
legal doctrine and finding satisfaction in each new discovery. He may breathe
the fumes of Texas Gulf Sulphur and proclaim it an exhilarating experience.
He may see in the developing federal law of corporations, which increasingly
seems to be a sort of federal common law, an accomplishment necessary and
2
wise.
Others begin with a different sense of history. Sensitive to the premises of
federalism, they are less ready to interfere with the traditional power of the
states over corporations and corporate fiduciaries. Agreeing with Holmes that
"the tendency of the law must always be to narrow the field of uncertainty,"3
they are disturbed by a sudden flood of murky, judge-made law that threatens
to displace some of the most carefully considered securities legislation of 1933
and 1934. They see the expansion of Rule 10b-5, particularly in the areas of
corporate mismanagement and private actions for damages, as contrary to the
4
will of Congress, haphazard and dangerous.
T

* Member of the New York Bar; B.A. University of Buffalo, 1950; LL.B., School of
Law, University of Buffalo, 1953.
1. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1965),
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by" the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
2. See, e.g., Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HAmv. L. Rv.

1146 (1965).

0. W. HOLMS, Ma COMM
2ON LAW 127 (1881).
4. See, e.g., two excellent articles by Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule iob-5:
Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963), and Pitfalls in the
Development of a Federal Law of Corporations through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. UtL. Rav.
185 (1964). Cf. Joseph, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5-A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. Rav. 171
3.

(1964).
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The debate is not whether the private right of action exists. All federal
circuits have now recognized it.5 Although the Supreme Court has reserved the
point,6 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak7 leaves little doubt that private enforcement of
Rule 10b-5 as well as of the proxy rules will be considered to provide "a necessary supplement to Commission action."8 The question is, rather, whether workable limits to the civil liabilities created pursuant to 10b-5 can be defined, and
specifically what persons or classes of persons will be permitted to assert that
they have been damaged by conduct which the Rule was intended to prevent.
II.

RATiONALE OF Tm

PRIVATE ACTION

Co.,0

a classic case of misrepresentation
In Kardon v. National Gypsum
and nondisclosure by insiders in the purchase of shares, Judge Kirkpatrick
offered two reasons for implying a private right of action under Rule 10b-5.
The one upon which he appeared to place the least reliance, although fully
adequate for the face-to-face transaction involved in that case, was the provision of section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act' 0 that contracts in violation of any provision of the Act (or any rule or regulation thereunder) shall
be void. Said Judge Kirkpatrick:
It seems to me that a statutory enactment that a contract of a certain
kind shall be void almost necessarily implies a remedy in respect of
it. The statute would be of little value unless a party to the contract
could apply to the Courts to relieve himself of obligations under it or
to escape its consequences.' 1
There was logic in this reasoning. Unless the aged maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius be taken to exclude all implied remedies from statutes that
contain express ones, the congressional purpose was not frustrated but furthered by the creation of a remedy in respect of a "void" contract. But the
cause of action that was easy to imply was also narrow in scope. Who but
parties to the contract, and perhaps third party beneficiaries, would be permitted to sue? And is not the "void contract theory," with its overtones of
privity,12 doctrinally irrelevant to a cause of action that sounds essentially
intort?
5. See cases cited in Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privily and
State of Mind in Rule lOb-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. Rrv. 423, n.46 (1968).
6. SEC v. Natl Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
7. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
8. Id. at 432.
9. 69 F. Supp. 512 (ED. Pa. 1946) (motion to dismiss); 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.
1947) (decision on merits); 83 F. Supp. 613 (ED. Pa. 1947) (additional findings of fact
and conclusion of law).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1965).
11. Kardon v. Natl Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (ED. Pa. 1946).
12. Cf. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), aff'd. on opinion below, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952), in which the court went
looking for a "semblance of privity between the vendor and purchaser" (99 F. Supp. at
706). It is submitted that two violations were alleged in Farnsworth: (1) The defendants'
sales of stock to an uninformed or misinformed market (March 19, 1948 to October 30,
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The other theory advanced by Judge Kirkpatrick in Kardon, the so-called
"statutory tort theory," appears to have been uppermost in his thinking and
certainly has proved far more significant in the development of 10b-5 jurisprudence. Disregard of the command of a statute, he said, "is a wrongful act
and a tort."'18 He apparently did not mean by this either that the statute itself
could be interpreted to imply a remedy in respect of the wrong which it forbade
(a conclusion which seemed doubtful to him in view of the express civil remedies
provided by other sections of the Exchange Act), or that the statute merely
redefined and elevated the standard of conduct expected of the defendants in
the context of a preexisting duty owed to the plaintiffs (e.g., common law
fraud or negligence). 14 The duty was not preexisting but new, derived from
the statute as implemented by Rule 10b-5, but the cause of action was judgecreated from "the general law" and "basic principles of tort law."' 5 This may
1948). As to this, the preence or absence of privity with the plaintiffs would plainly be
relevant. (2) The defendants' release, at or about the time the plaintiffs were purchasing
their shares (November 12, 1948 and subsequently), of materially false financial statements,
whereby the plaintiffs were caused to pay prices substantially in excess of those obtainable
when the true financial condition of the corporate defendant became known. Why should
privity of contract be required in this latter instance? In Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d
Cir. 1968), the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a brief amicus curiae, taking the
position (34 SEC Ann. Rep. 102-103 19681)
...that the language "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security"
in Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 is broad enough to be
applicable to statements made by a corporation whose securities are publicly held
whenever those statements are likely to affect the market for those securities,
irrespective of whether the corporation or those responsible for the dissemination of
the statement engage in securities transactions and irrespective of the absence of
any motive to affect the market.
Without citing Farnsworth, but following SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968), the court in Heit v. Weitzen accepted the Commission's position. It seems
fair to say that neither strict privity of contract nor the misty "semblance of privity"
found lacking in Farnsworth is necessary to a cause of action under Rule lob-5. See, e.g.,
Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242, 249 (6th Cir. 1962); Geo. H.
McFadden and Bro., Inc. v. Home-Stake Production Co., 295 F. Supp. 487, 488 (N:D. Okla.
1968); Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc. 229 F. Supp. 33, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1964); A.
BROIMERG, SEcuarrIEs LAW: FaAu--SEC RuLE 10B-5, § 8.5 (1969).
13. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 912, 513 (E.D. Pa., 1946). Judge Kirkpatrick cited and partly quoted section 286 of the RESTATEwENT OF ToRTs (1934), which
then provided as follows:
§ 286. Violations Creating Civil Liability.
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by
failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest
of another if:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest
of the other as an individual; and
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect; and
(c) where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular
results from that hazard; and
hazard, the invasion of the interests [sic]
(d) the violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not so
conducted himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action.
Section 286 has been modified in RESTATEN[ENT (SEcoN) or ToRTs (1965) to permit rather
than require the courts to adopt the legislative standard as a standard of conduct which
must bq met in order to avoid liability for negligence.
14. See generally Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77
HARv. L. Rxv. 285, 286 (1963).
15. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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lead to some confusion. What are these "basic principles of tort law" and how
are they to be engrafted upon 10b-S? The defendant in a recent case argued,
unsuccessfully, that since the implied cause of action has at least some doctrinal basis in section 286 of the Restatement of Torts, recovery should be
denied on the ground of contributory negligence. The court correctly replied
that nothing in the legislative history suggested any such limitation.10 In
another case the plaintiff, who had purchased stock on margin after receiving
a false "tip" from an insider, was denied recovery on the grounds of unclean
hands and in pari delicto: he had failed to repeat the "tip" to sellers of the
stock to him on the American Stock Exchange. 17 Judge Godbold dissented:
Neither the statute nor the SEC Rules provide for the doctrines of
in pari delicto and unclean hands in private 10b-S litigation. It seems
to me inadvisable to import the doctrines into the field.' 8
Judge Godbold was not suggesting that "basic principles of tort law" have nothing to do with lob-5. He was saying that common law doctrines should not be
casually applied in federal securities litigation without considering whether they
serve or subvert the statutory policy.
It is emphasis upon statutory policy which distinguishes the Court's opinion
in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak.19 Mr. Justice Clark found no need to talk about "statutory torts." The purpose of Securities Exchange Act section 14(a) 20 was to
ensure fair corporate suffrage. This broad remedial purpose was to be effectuated
by rules prescribed by the Securities and Exchange Commission "in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." In section 27 Congress conferred
upon the district courts exclusive jurisdiction "of all suits in equity and actions
at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the
rules and regulations thereunder." 21 Thus the private right to enforce the proxy
rules was born-to protect investors, to supplement Commission action, and to
carry out the will of Congress. When the Supreme Court is finally required to
confirm or deny the private right of action under Rule 10b-5, Borak by close
analogy would seem to indicate both the method and the result. The purpose
of section 10(b) is to ensure honest dealings in securities. This broad remedial
purpose has been effectuated by a rule prescribed by the Commission "in the
public interest or for the protection of investors." And section 27 applies as
fully to section 10(b) as to section 14(a). The result is a cause of action which,
like the statute from which it springs, is sui generis. Unknown at common law,
it may incorporate such of the wisdom of the Restatement as seems relevant
16. Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 412 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
filed No. 651 (Sept. 25, 1969).
17. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corporation, 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
18. Id. at 705. As Judge Godbold pointed out, in pari delicto seems to have lost all
validity as a defense in the anti-trust field. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
19. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1965).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1965).
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and reject the rest. Appearing in factual settings as complex and varied as the
practices of modern finance, it subtly invites expansion. But it invites also what
the court most experienced with 10b-5 has called "the search for limiting doctrine."2 2 The rest of this paper will pursue that search, and particularly will
contrast the "purchaser-seller" limitation of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.23
with the less restrictive rule advocated by the Securities and Exchange "Commission as amicus curiae in various cases.
III. THE SEARCH FOR LIMITING DocTiRIE

A. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.
In Birnbaum, a representative and derivative action brought by minority
stockholders of Newport Steel, the complaint alleged that defendants (the
directors and controlling stockholder of Newport) had rejected a favorable
merger offer from X corporation in order that the controlling stockholder might
sell control to Y corporation at a substantial premium. The plaintiffs alleged
specific misrepresentations in letters to the Newport stockholders at the time of
the negotiations with X and again after the sale to Y. In effect the complaint
alleged that but for the defendants' fraud, the plaintiffs would have been sellers
of stock to X corporation. The plaintiffs argued that 10b-5 should not be limited
to actual purchasers or sellers of securities, nor to actual purchases or sales, and
that the "in connection with" language of the statute and the Rule supported
this broader construction.
The brief filed for the defendant Feldmann (the controlling stockholder of
Newport) focused sharply on the legislative and regulatory history.24 A wealth
of material was gathered to support the proposition that only defrauded purchasers or sellers of securities are within the protection of Rule 10b-5, and that
mere breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders must be corrected in state
courts as before. 25 Particularly significant was the SEC's own announcement of
the adoption of Rule lob-5 on May 21, 1942:
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the
adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with
the purchase of securities. The previously existing rules against fraud
in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers and dealers. The
new rule closes a loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from
buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase.2 6
22. Mutual Shares Corporation v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1967).
23. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1956).
24. Brief of Messrs. Sullivan and Cromwell, attorneys for C. Russell Feldmann, defendant-appellee, 8-11 and passim.
25. Feldmann was subsequently held liable to accountto minority stockholders under
state law. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952

(1955).

26.

Securities Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). See also the further interpretation

contained in Securities Act Release No. 3634 (December 22, 1944), and the first published

investigation involving Rule 10b-5, Ward La France Truck Corporation, 13 S.E.C. 373, n.8

(1943).
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Relying upon this release in affirming a dismissal of the complaint, Judge
Augustus N. Hand wrote for a unanimous court:
While the Rule may have been somewhat loosely drawn its
meaning and scope are not difficult to ascertain when reference is
had to the scheme of SEC Regulation and the purpose underlying the
adoption of X-10b-5. Prior to its adoption the only prohibitions
against fraud in the sale or purchase of securities were contained in
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(a), and § 15(c)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(c). Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act
only made it unlawful to defraud or deceive purchasers of securities,
and Section 15 (c) of the 1934 Act dealt only with fraudulent practices
by security brokers or dealers in over-the-counter markets. No prohibition existed against fraud on a seller of securities by the purchaser
if the latter was not a broker or a dealer.2 7
Counsel for the SEC has suggested that Birnbaum could more properly
have been decided on the ground that "there was no indication of any causal
connection between the alleged violation of Rule lob-5 and the injury to the
corporation and its shareholders. The violation consisted of the making of misrepresentations." 28 The alleged violation was not limited to the making of misrepresentations; it consisted of the whole dishonest course of conduct, implemented and concealed by misrepresentations, whereby the controlling stockholder
first chilled a merger offer that "would have been highly profitable to all the
stockholders of Newport," 29 and then sold control at twice the market value of
the stock to a company which intended to use Newport as a captive source of
steel. These non-verbal acts, as well as the misrepresentations, were the fraud
complained of in Birnbaum and clearly were causally connected to the plaintiffs'
injury.
Whether Birnbaum be regarded as standing rigidly in the way of protection
of legitimate federal interests, 0 or as the correct and necessary result of the
legislative and regulatory history, 81 (it seems to this writer to be the latter),
its prestige is somewhat uncertain in the court of its origin. Later decisions of
the second circuit can be read as interpreting and confirming the purchaserseller rule, but recurrent dicta suggest at least some uneasiness with it. The
thread of doubt may be traced quickly through a series of recent cases. First,
the court held that a derivative action could properly be brought under Rule
lob-5 to enjoin the sale of treasury stock. In an atmosphere of non-disclosure
27. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1992).
28. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 18, Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China
(2d Cir. Nov. 3, 1969).
29. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 462 (2d Cir. 1952).
30. Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lob-5,
4 VA. L. Ray. 268 (1968). The purchaser-seller limitation is neither reauired nor suggested
by the broad language of 10b-5, says Lowenfels, and "seems incomnatible with the broad
soectrum of private rights which have mushroomed under the federal securities laws in the
last twenty years." Id. at 27-76.
31. Loss, SacuaRrms REGu-Aox, 3617 (2d ed. Supp. 1969); Comment, The Expanding Uses of Rule 10b-5, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rxv. 313, 316-17 (1969).
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and misfeasance, insiders were about to purchase 75,000 treasury shares to
shore up their control of the corporation. The court had no difficulty holding
that the issuance by a corporation of its own shares is a "sale" within the federal securities laws, and that a corporation may be defrauded by a majority of
its own directors.3 2 Birnbaum was cited with apparent approval, but distinguished on the ground that the Newport Steel Corp. was not a seller. Thus the
court opened its doors to cases of fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, but only if the corporation was a party to a securities transaction.
Two other cases decided in quick succession presented further variations
on the purchaser-seller theme, and came close to suggesting that the score might
have to be rewritten altogether. In Vine v. Beneficial Finance Company, Inc.. 33
a minority stockholder of Crown Finance Company alleged a fraudulent conspiracy between Crown's officers and directors and the defendant Beneficial
Finance Company. After acquiring over 90% of the outstanding stock of Crown
by private negotiation and public tender offer, Beneficial had effected a short
form merger which did not require approval by Crown's remaining minority
stockholders. The plaintiff had neither accepted Beneficial's offer to purchase
his Crown stock nor surrendered his stock in the short form merger. All he had
left was his right of appraisal or certificates of ownership in a non-existent
corporation. In A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow,3 4 a member of the New York
Stock Exchange alleged a fraudulent scheme on the part of the defendants to
place purchase orders for listed securities with the intention of paying for them
only if their market value had increased by the payment date. As a result of the
defendants' refusal to pay for various purchases, the plaintiff was compelled to
sell the securities at a loss. The defendants in both of these cases moved to dismiss on the law, presumably arguing that only non-federal causes of action, if
any, were alleged (in Vine, violations of fiduciary duty; in Brod, breach of
contract). Judge Bonsal dismissed both complaints on the ground that the plaintiffs were not purchasers or sellers of securities. The court of appeals reversed,
32. Ruckle v. Roto American Corporation, 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); but see the
very similar case of O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), in which the court

rejected the position of the SEC as amicus curiae that a 10b-5 claim is stated by an allegation that a corporation's "controlling directors caused it to acquire a large block of its own
stock at an excessive price for the purpose of removing the threat to the directors' control
represented by the stock." 339 F.2d at 768. In SEC v. Nat'l Securities, Inc., 393 U.S.
324, 335 (1969), Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, cited O'Neill
v. Maytag as "a decision which has been commonly understood to have reaffirmed the
vitality of the Birnbaum doctrine . . . ." But in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nor. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), the
court sitting en banc displaced an earlier panel decision (405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968)), and
upheld a complaint in a 10b-5 derivative action which alleged that the board of directors
had approved sales of unissued shares of the corporation's stock to another corporation
which allegedly dominated the seller. Three judges dissented in an opinion by Medina, J.
(405 F.2d at 220): ,

This does indeed open the floodgates. For the result is to transform a simple cause
of action against directors for waste or the use of bad judgment in the sale of
corporate assets into a federal securities fraud case by judicial fiat.
33. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
34. 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
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holding that Vine was a forced seller and Brod a forced buyer, and that the
various fraudulent practices alleged were "in connection with" such forced transactions.3 5
There is nothing remarkable about the actual holdings in Vine and Brod.
The cases present reasonable applications of the purchaser-seller rule and appear
to have been decided within the framework of existing precedent. What is remarkable about them is the deference paid to the SEC's argument as amicus
curiae in Vine... that plaintiff need not even be a selling stockholder to sue under
10b-5, so long as the Rule has been violated and plaintiff's stock lost
value as a result . . . . In view of our disposition of this case, it is
unnecessary to deal with this interesting contention. 6
and in BrodPrior decisions in this Circuit have been, on occasions, interpreted as
standing for the rule that only a purchaser or seller may bring a Rule
lob-5 action. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp . . . . The
Commission, in recent cases, has urged that this interpretation of the
Act is too narrow. See Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co ....
We need not
consider 3that
contention
since
appellant
is
clearly
a
purchaser
of
7
securities.
Although the court in Vine and Brod simply found it unnecessary to consider
the Commission's "interesting contention," those cases were later cited to prove
that "this court has expressly left undecided the question whether one who is
neither a purchaser nor a seller can attack a transaction under Rule 10b-5 .... -38
Still later, however, the court headed strongly back toward Birnbaum, at least
so far as actions for damages are concerned,3 9 and as this article is written the
purchaser-seller rule enjoys good acceptance in the district courts. 40
35. Having been twice reversed when he thought he was following Birnbaum, one

can readily understand judge Bonsal's reversal of himself (on motion to reargue)
in Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967):
In view of Vine and Brod and the position taken by the SEC, it may well be that
the purchaser-or-seller requirement of Birnbaum will not be followed when the
question is next presented to the Court of Appeals.
36. 374 F.2d at 636.
37. 375 F.2d at 397, n.3.
38. Symington Wayne Corporation v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 383 F.2d 840, 842 (2d
Cir. 1967).
39. Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corporation (2d Cir., November 3,
1969); Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580, 581 (2d Cir. 1968); Mutual Shares Corporation
v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). This article was written before the decision
in Iroquois, in which judge Wyatt (of the southern district of New York, sitting by
designation), joined by Chief judge Lumbard and judge Anderson, distinguished the Vine
and Brod cases as discussed in the text, and concluded (slip opinion at 3790): "We adhere
to the result and the reasoning of Birnbaum." A majority of the judges of the court have
now reaffirmed Birnbaum (Lumbard, C. J., and Anderson, J., in Iroquois; Moore and
Smith, JJ., in Genesco and Greenstein v. Paul, supra; and Feinberg, 3., in Genesco.)

40. Manhattan Casualty Co. v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083

(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Erling v. Powell, 298 F. Supp. 1154 (D.S.D. 1969); Kahan v. Rosensteil,
300 F. Supp. 447 (D. Dl. 1969); Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Larson v. Tony's Investments, Inc., 46 FRD 612 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
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B. The Role of State Courts
The distinction which has evolved in the second circuit between state law
claims for corporate mismanagement and similar breaches of fiduciary duty,
and federal claims involving fraudulent securities transactions, although difficult to draw in peripheral cases, 41 seems fundamentally sound. The creation of
a private right of action for damages under 10b-5 was a judicial innovation bold
enough without permitting the Rule to ingest a multitude of responsibilities and
relationships historically governed by state law. Certainly one would expect such
a development to have clear and convincing support in the policy and the provisions of the securities acts. In fact, one almost finds the opposite. Section 2
of the Exchange Act ("Necessity for regulation") 4 2 repeatedly speaks of "transactions in securities," the "prices established and offered in such transactions"
and "the prices at which securities are bought and sold." And the provisions of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts which confer express rights of action generally are limited to purchases or sales of securities, and are further restricted either by requirements of privity or by carefully defined defenses. 43 The limitations and
restrictions which Congress imposed upon the express rights of action, while not
directly applicable to Rule lob-5, are perhaps suggestive of the shape it ought
to take. This analogy, strengthened by the legislative history discussed in Birnbaum and the thrust of section 2, seems persuasive that the judisdictional clause
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" was intended to restrict the Rule's protection to the defrauded purchaser or seller of a security.
The alternative, or at least one alternative, is to conceive of 10b-5, as some
lawyers do, 44 as a charter of investor protection almost unlimited in its reach,
with implications for the law-making process and federal-state relations well
41. See cases cited supra note 32.

42. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1965).

43. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Civil liabilities on account of false
registration statement"), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1965), creates a cause of action in favor of
sany person acquiring such security" and contains a special due diligence defense and a
limitation on damages. Section 12 of the 1933 Act ("Civil liabilities in connection with
prospectuses and communications"), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1965), requires privity of contract.
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act ("Fraudulent interstate transactions"), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(1965), the doctrinal antecedent of Rule 10b-5, deals with fraud practiced upon purchasers.
Section 9 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Manipulation of security prices"), 15
U.S.C. § 78i (1964), creates a cause of action in favor of "any person who shall purchase or
sell any security at a price which was affected by such act or transaction .

. . ."

Section

16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § '78p(b) (1965), permits only the corporation (or a
security holder suing on its behalf) to recover insider trading profits. Section 18 of the
1934 Act ("Liability for misleading statements"), 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1965), benefits only a
person "who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a
price which was affected by such statement .... "
44. Cf. Pollack, J., dismissing the complaint in Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403,
406 (S.D.N.Y. 1968):
The complaint herein is representative of a growing number of lob-5 suits
brought in this Court on unique, esoteric and implausible legal theories. Innovation
is not to be discouraged, nor the imaginative instinct dulled. However, claims
cloaked in a tissue of confusion devoid of federal jurisdiction or legal merit,
impede rather than foster progress in the field of investor protection.
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reviewed elsewhere. 45 At least one state court, however, has recently faced the
invading federal corporation law with a firm reassertion of state power.
In Diamond v. Oreamuno46 the New York Court of Appeals entertained a
derivative action to recover for the benefit of the corporation an $800,000
profit 47 realized by insiders who had quietly sold 56,500 shares of stock before
a drastic decline in corporate earnings was made public. On motion to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the defendants pursued three
lines of attack. They first argued that a derivative action could not be brought
since the corporation had not been damaged. For a unanimous court Chief Judge
Fuld replied that an allegation of damage was unnecessary to a cause of action
founded on a breach of fiduciary duty, and that the corporation's reputation
and good will might have been harmed in any event. The defendants' second
contention was that sections 10(b) and 16(b) 48 of the Exchange Act in effect
preempted the field of available remedies for abuse of inside information. The
court replied that the defendants may not have violated section 16(b) since
they apparently had held the stock for more than six months. Moreover, a
successful 10b-S action was doubtful because of several unresolved questions
relating to the federal class action49 and the difficulty of tracing seller to buyer
in an individual action. Finally, the defendants pointed out that if they were
required to disgorge the $800,000 profit for the benefit of the corporation they
might be subjected to double liability in suits by actual purchasers of the stock.
Unmoved by this plea, Chief Judge Fuld observed that if the defendants wished
to protect themselves against double liability it was up to them to interplead
any and all possible claimants and bind them to the judgment.5 0
The opinion is notable for its narrow view of the scope of federal securities
regulation. Thus, we are told that the federal remedies are "rather limited;" 5 1
that the 10b-5 remedy is not "really effective" and is beset with "practical
difficulties;" ' 52 and that the possibility of suit by purchasers from the defendants is "quite remote." 53 Chief Judge Fuld further stated:
There is nothing in the Federal law which indicates that it was intended to limit the power of the States to fashion additional remedies
45. See Ruder, supra note 4.
46. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
47. This "profit" was apparently measured by the difference between what the defendants realized for their shares and what they would have realized if they had sold after
the earnings decline was made public.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1965).
49. "These include the definition of the class entitled to bring such an action, the
measure of damages, the administration of the fund which would be recovered and its
distribution to members of the class." Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 503, 248
N.E.2d 910, 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 83 (1969). Cf. Comment, Damages in Class Actions: Deterruination and Allocation, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rzv. 615, 623-24 (1969), acknowledging
the difficulties but concluding that the class action is an "efficient means" of adjudicating
the claims of numerous defrauded purchasers or sellers.
50. N.Y. CPLR § 1006(b) (McKinney 1963) ("Defensive interpleader").
51. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 502, 248 N.E.2d 910, 914, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 84 (1969).
52. Id. at 503, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
53. Id. at 504, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
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to effectuate similar purposes. Although the impact of Federal securities regulation has on occasion been said to have created a "Federal
corporation law," in fact, its effect on the duties and obligations of
directors and officers and their relation to the corporation and its
shareholders is only occasional and peripheral. The primary source
of the law in this area ever remains that of the State which created
the corporation. Indeed, Congress expressly provided against any
implication that it intended to pre-empt the field by declaring, in section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (48 U.S. Code
903), that '[t]he rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in
addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at
law or in equity'. 54
Not many corporate lawyers would describe the impact of federal law on
the duties of corporate insiders as "only occasional and peripheral." In fact,
the court in Diamond v. Oreamuno seems to have taken some care to justify
an additional state remedy in a field already heavily regulated by federal law.
Here is a workable common law alternative, the court seems to be saying, to
the increasing federalization of a large body of litigation traditionally governed
by state law (e.g., breach of fiduciary duty, corporate opportunity and the
like). The decision, however, will do little to soothe the troubled area of insider
trading. Even if the defendants were to organize a class action against themselves, and manage to obtain jurisdiction of the class in state court, the 10b-5
claim of such third party defendants would appear to be in the wrong forum. 55
Conversely, if the defendants do not bring the purchasers of their stock into
state court, will or can the corporation be required to give up any part of its
recovery in the derivative action in a later class or individual action by defrauded purchasers in federal court? There are fine questions of jurisdiction
and of federal-state relations involved here. If lOb-5 can be used to redress
wrongs that ought to be remedied in state courts, perhaps the derivative action
can be used to redress wrongs more properly correctible by lOb-5. And if the
remarkable expansion of federal securities regulation which has occurred in the
past twenty years, and particularly in the last five, was necessary to fill a void
in state regulation of the same subject, perhaps the void is now being doubly
filled.
C. Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp.56
We have noted the SEC's contention as amicus curiae that the plaintiff
need not be a purchaser or seller to sue under lOb-5, so long as the Rule has
54. Id. at 503-04, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
55. Securities Exchange Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1965), grants the federal district
courts "exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability
or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." Since the claim
of the purchasers from the defendants in Diamond v. Oreamuno, would be based on nondisclosure by persons having no confidential or fiduciary relationship to the claimants, it is
doubtful that such claim could successfully be grounded on common law fraud. Amend v.
Hurley, 293 N.Y. 587, 596, 59 N.E.2d 416, 419 (1944); People's Bank of City of New York
v. Bogart, 81 N.Y. 101, 107 (1880).
56. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 92,301 (W.D.N.Y. 1968).
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been violated with regard to someone else and the plaintiff's stock has lost value
as a result. As reiterated in Iroquois Industries, the Commission's position has
advanced a step further. Iroquois had made an unsuccessful tender offer for
50,000 shares of Syracuse China at $60 per share (more than 113,000 shares
were outstanding). The complaint alleged that Syracuse China and its management, aided and abetted by various co-defendants, defeated the tender offer
by circulating a false report of a possible tax-free merger of Syracuse China
with another corporation. Syracuse China management also made a counter-offer
of $60 per share. Allegedly because of the merger report and purchases by management, only 9,000 shares were tendered to the plaintiff. In separate counts
based on 10b-5 and pendent jurisdiction, the plaintiff demanded damages of
$1,640,000, i.e., $40 per share for the 41,000 shares that were not tendered. The
theory of the case apparently was that if the plaintiff had succeeded in gaining
control of Syracuse China and had operated its business for some period of time
as a division or subsidiary of Iroquois, the stock might have been worth $100
per share instead of the $60 tender price. In granting the defendants' motions
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the district court
observed that "the plaintiff, while a purchaser, cannot claim to be either a defrauded purchaser or a purchaser who, in purchasing its shares, relied in any
57
way upon the alleged fraud."
The case presents various categories of persons who conceivably might
have 10b-5 claims on the facts alleged. Certainly persons who purchased
Syracuse China stock in anticipation of a tax-free merger could recover their
actual damages from those responsible for the merger announcement. Conversely, Syracuse China stockholders who sold their shares, whether to members
of management or in the over-the-counter market, would seem not entitled to
sue under Rule lob-5 because their conduct is inconsistent with any claim of
deception or reliance on the merger negotiations. But what of persons who,
instead of tendering or selling, held their stock in reliance upon the merger
report? They may very well have been deceived and damaged, but their
damages are "in connection with" the retention, not the purchase or sale, of a
security. Unless one who is fraudulently induced to hold a security which he
would otherwise have sold is to be regarded as a "constructive purchaser" of
the same security, it is doubtful that a claim under Rule 10b-5 could be successfully pleaded. 58 And what of the plaintiff Iroquois Industries, which had
57. Id. at 97,434. After the preparation of this article, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the dismissal of the complaint, stating (slip opinion, November 3, 1969, p. 3783):
Iroquois is not here complaining that it was misled by the acts of defendants as
to any purchases or sales by it of Syracuse China stock; indeed, its basic complaint
is that, because of the acts of defendants, it could not purchase such shares. In
effect, Iroquois complains of fraud by defendants on the stockholders of Syracuse
China who sold to the management of Syracuse China or otherwise refused to
tender to Iroquois.
58. In Geller v. Bohen, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 92,429 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), the court
dismissed a count which alleged that plaintiffs were deprived of the opportunity of tendering their shares when the tactics of the target company (including a so-called "defensive
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neither purchased, sold nor held in reliance upon the merger announcement and
did not claim to have been deceived by it?
It is questionable whether the mere making of a tender offer, the mere
attempt to purchase, could give Iroquois Industries the status of a purchaser
under Rule 10b-5. While the Exchange Act defines "purchase" and "sale" to
include any contract to purchase or sell, 59 there appears to be no justification
for expanding these terms to include offers, negotiations and attempts. 60 The
complaint in Iroquois Industries made claim not for any loss on the 9,000 shares
that were purchased, but for an assumed profit on the 41,000 shares that were
not purchased. The SEC as amicus curiae argued that this lost profit was "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security" because the merger announcement was likely to cause other investors either to purchase or to hold
Syracuse China common stock. This likelihood of influencing the investment
decisions of third parties, said the Commission, is a sufficient violation of 10b-5
in the abstract, and the complaint need only allege that the deception practiced
upon third parties was the cause of the plaintiff's injury. The heart of the
Commission's position is set forth in the following extracts from its brief:
It is the Commission's view that, notwithstanding
reliance and notwithstanding the fact that it may
purchaser or seller, Iroquois does have standing
present action and that such result is consistent with
decisions. 61

Iroquois' lack of
not have been a
to maintain the
this Court's prior

The availability of the Act's protections, however, is not limited to
persons who are themselves deceived. Participants in the securities
markets are entitled to expect that the Act will provide them an
honest market place in which to do business. Thus, it is not enough
that a person entering the market have protection against being himself deceived. He also needs and expects protection against injury
merger") caused the withdrawal of the tender offer, but sustained another count which
alleged new purchases by the plaintiffs at the top of a market stimulated by the defendant's
news releases and similar activities.
59. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a) (13) (14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (13) (14)

(1965).
60. A careful reading of the 1934 Act discloses that Congress did not lack suitable
substitute or qualifying language to describe something other than a conventional purchase
or sale; e.g., "purchases or prospective purchases," § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)
(1965), "purchasing or offering to purchase," § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1965), and "inducing the purchase or sale" or "to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale," §§ 9
(a) (2) and 15(c) (3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a) (2) and 78o(c) (3) (1965). The SEC's 1957 and
1959 legislative programs, if enacted by Congress, would have amended section 10(b) to
read as follows:
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of, or any attempt
to purchase or sell .... [Italics added.]
S. 2545 and H.R. 9327, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. 1179 and H.R. 2480, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959). An explanatory statement introduced with S. 2545 stated that the bill
"would also reach manipulative and deceptive activities in connection with attempts to
buy or sell securities as well as in connection with consummated transactions." 103 Cong. Rec.
11,636 (1957). See also Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and
Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 12 (1959).
61. Brief, supra note 28, at 13.
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which he will necessarily suffer, in connection with his transactions and
proposed transactions in securities, as a result of deception practiced
upon others; if, as the complaint alleges here, deception is practiced
upon others for the purpose of preventing him from entering into
securities transactions with those other persons, and he2 is so prevented,
he should be entitled to sue for resulting damages.
The Commission's reasoning seems faulty on several counts. First, there
simply is no absolute principle of law to the effect that a statutory violation
plus an injury equals a cause of action. In a suit by one motor carrier against
another to recover damages caused by the defendant's carriage of goods in
violation of the Motor Carrier Act, precisely that argument (with an assist
from the Restatement of Torts and an analogy to 10b-5) was made and rejected. 63 And the Supreme Court has declined to create a federal cause of action
for damages sustained by one public utility at the hands of another which had
charged unreasonable rates contrary to the Federal Power Act.6a As noted previously, judge Kirkpatrick in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.65 relied to some
extent on a provision of the Restatement of Torts that failure to observe a
statutory standard of care may give rise to liability for negligence. Such
liability may not be imposed, however, without a considered judicial determination that the interest asserted by the plaintiff is one which the statute
was intended to protect. From the simplistic premise that section 10(b) was
enacted "in the public interest or for the protection of investors," it perhaps
follows that any injured investor (or member of the public?) may recover his
damages caused by a violation of the Rule. But if significance is to be given
the limiting phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,"
a narrower reading is called for.
Second, while the Commission's interpretation is entirely reasonable as
applied to disciplinary and injunctive proceedings,"0 if applied to private actions
for damages it would expand 10b-5 liabilities to an extent that seems permissible only by express amendment of the statute or the Rule. The following
examples, in each of which it is assumed that an alleged violation of 10b-5 with
respect to third parties has proximately caused the plaintiff's injury, will suggest a few of the innumerable situations in which such a greatly expanded rule
would apply:
62. Id. at 21. The court of appeals in its opinion characterized the SEC's brief as in
substance an invitation to overrule Birnbaum, but did not otherwise comment on the amlcus
brief or the interpretation of 10b-5 contended for by the Commission.
63. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. United Truck Lines, Inc., 216 F.2d 543 (9th Cir.
1954). The provision of the Restatement relied upon was § 710, "Engaging in Business in
Violation of Legislative Enactment."
64. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246

(1951).
65.

69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.Pa. 1946).

66. It is settled that the "in connection with" language as well as other ingredients of
10b-S (e.g., negligent misstatement vs. scienter) may take on different meanings in injunctive
proceedings by the SEC or a private party than in private actions for money damages.
Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
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1. Plaintiff, a speculator or trader specializing in mining stocks, alleges
that if Texas Gulf Sulphur had issued a more accurate press release on April
12, 1964, he would have purchased a specified number of shares within a short
time thereafter. While he has parted with nothing of value, he complains that
he was deprived of the opportunity to make a profit.
2. Plaintiff places an order to buy a security at a fixed price. Before the
order can be executed, the market rises sharply above this price in reaction to
an exaggerated earnings report just released. Again, plaintiff is neither a
purchaser nor a seller of the security, but alleges that the company has violated
Rule 10b-5 to his detriment.
3. Same as example 2, except that plaintiff alleges he would have sold
short if the false earnings report had not been issued.
4. Trading in the common stock of a listed company is suspended because
defendants have manipulated the market. During the suspension period, unfavorable news about the company is released, and when trading is resumed
the market is drastically lower. Plaintiff alleges that he would have sold his
stock before the news release if trading had not been suspended.
5. Company A obtains control of company B by wrongful purchases in
violation of Rule 10b-5, and thereafter proceeds to misuse the assets of company B to the injury of B's minority shareholders, including plaintiff. 67
6. The treasurer of a closely-held corporation embezzles its bank account
and, naturally, conceals his crime. One or more stockholders bring a 10b-5
action in federal court, alleging that their stock has lost value as a result of the
fraud. And fraud there is, at least in what Jennings and Marsh call the
"modern" sense of "do something bad to." 88 Is this really too far-fetched? A
very similar action has recently been brought (and dismissed) in the southern
district of New York.69
7. Plaintiff, a stockholder of company X, sues company Y (a competitor
of X) and its officers and directors, alleging a conspiracy to overstate its
earnings and raise the price of its stock, and that the stock of X has suffered
in the market by comparison with the quoted price of Y.
The writer believes that none of. the foregoing cases presents a violation
of Rule 10b-5 as it has heretofore been understood. In the first three examples
the plaintiff is not even a stockholder of the subject company; like Iroquois
Industries he alleges that but for the defendant's fraud he would have been a
purchaser or seller of the stock. In examples four, five and six, the plaintiff is a
stockholder whose shares have lost value, but is not a purchaser or seller of a
security. In example seven the plaintiff is an injured stockholder, but not of
the corporation with respect to which the violation occurred. In most of the
67. Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968).
68. JENNINGS & MARSH, SEcuRIS REGuLATIOx 961 (2d ed. 1968).
69. Manhattan Casualty Co. v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).

BUFFALO LAW REVIZEW
examples there is nothing even remotely resembling deception of the plaintiff or
reliance by him, yet he is in each case an investor or potential investor "injured" by the defendant's fraud on a third party. But what is the nature of
this "injury," and is it of the sort which the Exchange Act was intended to
redress?
D. A Question of Damages
70

Section 28(a) limits the plaintiff's recovery in any suit under the Exchange Act to "his actual damages on account of the act complained of." In
suits by defrauded sellers the courts have sometimes awarded the plaintiff a
rescission measure of damages (difference between the selling price and actual
value at the time of trial), 71 and sometimes an out-of-pocket measure of
damages (difference between the selling price and actual value at the time of
sale). 72 In suits by defrauded purchasers, however, the out-of-pocket measure
seems to prevail, and the courts have declined to award plaintiff buyers "the
expectant fruits of an unrealized speculation." 78 In most of the examples above
(certainly in the first three) and in Iroquois Industries, the "damages" alleged
were wholly hypothetical and speculative, consisting of nothing more than a
missed opportunity to make a profit on an investment that was not made. If
such "damages" are not recoverable under section 28(a), an interpretation of
Rule 10b-5 or a theory of standing to sue that would permit such a recovery
seems unacceptably at odds -with the intent of Congress.
There is a school of thought, however, that section 28(a) does not apply
to actions under Rule 10b-5. The argument is that section 28(a) by its terms
is applicable only to suits "permitted" by the Exchange Act. Suits under section
10(b) are not specifically so permitted, but are derived from "the general
law of tortious injury" 74 or "federal common law."7 This reasoning, which
would allow the recovery of punitive as well as actual damages, 76 brings us
back to our point of departure. If, as Judge Kirkpatrick said in Kardon, the
10b-5 right of action is derived from "the general law" and "basic principles
of tort law," 77 there is perhaps no reason why the courts should not award punitive damages, or conversely deny relief altogether on the grounds of contributory
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964): "EN]o person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment
in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the
act complained of."
71. Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 145 (D. Md. 1968).
72. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (ED. Wisc. 1962), aff'd. 319 F.2d 634

(7th Cir. 1963).

73. Estate Counselling Service, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962). See Note, Remedies for Private Parties under Rdc lOb-5,
10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 337, 349 (1969).
74. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
75. deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 302 F. Supp. 647, 649 (D. Col. 1969).
76. Cases cited supra notes 74 and 75; contra: Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291,
303 (2d Cir. 1968).
77. 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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negligence, unclean hands and all the rest. But if J. I. Case Co. v. Borak78
correctly teaches that the implied right of action must closely parallel and
always serve the statutory policy, there is error in awarding punitive damages
when Congress has said "actual damages." There is error, too, in redressing
fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" by awarding a
non-purchaser the profit he thinks he would have made if he had purchased the
security.
IV. CONCLUSION

In The Three Faces of Power A. A. Berle states his thesis that ultimate
legislative power has come to reside in the Supreme Court of the United
States. 79 He uses as examples of this judicial activism such cases as Brown v.
Board of Education80 and Baker v. Carr8l in the field of civil rights and the
Clorox divestiture case82 in the field of economics. He quotes Chief Justice
Hughes' description of the Sherman Antitrust Act as "a charter of freedom"
having "a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable
in constitutional provisions."83 He might also have mentioned Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills,84 wherein the Court accepted responsibility for developing a federal common law of collective bargaining agreements. Business lawyers
will be familiar with many more such examples, and by and large are not
disturbed by them. In all such cases the Court's power is derived either from the
Constitution itself or from a congressional enactment whose intended substantive effect cannot be achieved unless the judiciary assumes a policy-making as
well as an interpretive role.
Considered as a species of federal common law, the jurisprudence spawned
by Rule lOb-5 seems less defensible than the examples previously mentioned.
It was not to the courts impliedly, but to the SEC expressly, that Congress
delegated the responsibility of further defining the crimes and torts to be forbidden by section 10(b). The statute itself was totally inoperative for the first
eight years of its existence because of the failure of the Commission to prescribe
rules and regulations "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors." When in 1942 the Commission finally exercised its
rule-making authority, it simply repeated the jurisdictional language of section
10(b) ("any person," "interstate commerce" and "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security"), and gave it substantive life by copying almost
verbatim the anti-fraud provisions of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act.88 This
may have been a good enough job at the time, but far better efforts have not
78. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
79. A. BEEiL, THE Tmm FACES OF Pown 3 (1967).
80. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (school desegregation).
81. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (legislative reapportionment).
82. Federal Trade Commission v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
83. Appalachian Coals Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1932).
84. 353 U.S. 448 (1957); see Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HIAv. L. 1, v.
1512, 1531-35 (1969).
85. See supra note 43.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
withstood the changes wrought by time and experience. After nearly thirty
years of experience with Rule 10b(5) and nearly twenty-five with the private
action, has nothing been learned which could usefully be incorporated into an
amended or restated rule? Or is the prose of 1942 timeless in its clarity and its

verity?
Professor Marsh sees little likelihood that the Commission will attempt a
codification of Rule 10b-5. He foresees only chaos. 80 Former SEC Chairman
Cohen tells us (unofficially, of course) that whatever expertise the Commission
has, it will make available to judges through its amicus participation in selected
cases. The courts, he says, will have to hammer out the principles of liability,
case by case in good common law tradition.8 7 In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co. the Commission actually invited the district court "to fix a reasonable
waiting period after an announcement is made, during which insiders cannot
purchase stock," but Judge Bonsai with a bow to the Commission's expertise
and its rule-making powers politely declined the invitation.88 He could not have
done otherwise. The SEC possesses both the responsibility and the authority
to implement section 10(b) by rule and regulation. No reason appears why the
Commission should not prepare guidelines on insider trading, and while about
it undertake the larger task of stating the conditions of 10(b) liability generally.8 9 Perhaps the Commission is fearful that such informative phrases as
"device, scheme or artifice to defraud" would lose some of their verbal impact
in association with duller concepts of reliance, causation and state of mind.
Perhaps the Commission, enforcement-minded as it ought to be, simply prefers
a vague but expanding rule to a more precise one that would attract judicial
scrutiny and, probably, limitation. Whatever the reason, the Commission in
Rule 10b-5 has told us nothing that was not obvious from the statute itself.
86. Marsh, What Lies Ahead under Rule lOb-5?, 24 Bus. LAW. 69 (1968).
87. Cohen, The Development of Rule 10b-5, 23 Bus. LAW. 593, 597 (1968).
88. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), afJ'd. in
part and rev'd. in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
89. A good starting point would be sections 25402 and 25502 of the California Corporate Securities Law of 1968, eff. Jan. 2, 1969:
25402. It is unlawful for an issuer or any person who is an officer, director or
controlling person of an issuer or any other person whose relationship to the issuer
gives him access, directly or indirectly, to material information about the issuer not
generally available to the public, to purchase or sell any security of the issuer in
this state at a time when he knows material information about the issuer gained
from such relationship which would significantly affect the market price of that
security and which is not generally available to the public, and which he knows
is not intended to be so available, unless he has reason to believe that the person
selling to or buying from him is also in possession of the information.
25502. Any person who violates Section 25402 shall be liable to the person who
purchases a security from him or sells a security to him, for damages equal to the
difference between the price at which such security was purchased or sold and the
market value which such security would have had at the time of the purchase or
sale if the information known to the defendant had been publicly disseminated prior
to that time and a reasonable time had elapsed for the market to absorb the
information, plus interest at the legal rate, unless the defendant proves that the
plaintiff knew the information or that the plaintiff would have purchased or sold
at the same price even if the information had been revealed to him.
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The task of drawing the outer limits of section 10(b), and defining the
circumstances giving rise to criminal and civil responsibility within those limits,
is thus transferred from the Commission to the courts, and ultimately to the
Supreme Court of the United States. It is a task which the Commission is
probably better equipped to handle. An administrative agency can inform
itself in ways that courts cannot. It can consider broad questions of policy
unimpeded by the need to decide particular cases. And judges in doing the
Commission's work know that they are only the sub-delegates of Congress.
They have not the full rule-making power that was intended for the Commission. Even if they had, they could hardly disregard the administrative and
legislative history documented in Birnbaum,90 which points strongly to the
conclusion that section 10(b) was intended to extend the protection of section
17(a) of the 1933 Act to the defrauded seller as well as the defrauded purchaser
of a security.91 If this is too narrow a scheme of investor protection, if section
10(b) should reach into the area of state regulation and secure federal rights
to security holders generally in their relations with one another and with their
corporations, it is not because Birnbaum and Iroquois were wrongly decided.
It is because, after a third of a century of unequalled economic growth and
financial change, neither Congress nor Commission has seen fit to amend the
governing language of 1934 and 1942.
90. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2nd Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1956).
91. See Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., (2d Cir. Nov. 3, 1969):
"The Birnbaum rule recognizes the policy of Congress in enacting Section 10(b) and of the
Commission in adopting Rule 10b-5, namely, the protection of defrauded purchasers and
sellers. It is not the province of the courts to extend Section 10(b) to apply to transactions
not intended to be covered by Congress."

